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___________ 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Tarmac Roofing Systems, Inc., ("Tarmac") 
appeals a $1,423,392.50 judgment entered after a jury trial in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on appellee Stelwagon Manufacturing Company's 
("Stelwagon") secondary line price discrimination and state 
breach of contract claims.0  Specifically, the jury found that 
Tarmac had discriminated against Stelwagon on the basis of price 
in violation of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act (commonly 
referred to as the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act), 15 
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982),0 and, accordingly, that Stelwagon was 
                     
0
 Secondary line cases involve discrimination affecting 
competition among customers of the discriminating seller.  Barr 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 978 F.2d 98, 106 
(3d Cir. 1992); J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 
F.2d 1524, 1526 (3d Cir. 1990). 
0
 Section 2(a) provides in pertinent part: 
 
 It shall be unlawful for any person 
engaged in commerce, in the course of such 
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to 
discriminate in price between different 
purchasers of commodities of like grade and 
3 
entitled to recover treble damages pursuant to section 4 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).0  The jury also determined that 
Tarmac breached an oral, exclusive distributorship agreement with 
Stelwagon.  Although we believe that Stelwagon established a 
prima facie violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, we believe it 
failed to present sufficient proof of actual antitrust damages 
and is, therefore, precluded from recovering damages under the 
Clayton Act.  Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's 
judgment insofar as it awards Stelwagon treble damages under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act.  We will, however, affirm with 
respect to the breach of contract claim because we believe the 
district court correctly concluded that the contract claim was 
not barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
                                                                  
quality, . . . where the effect of such 
discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, 
or prevent competition with any person who 
either grants or knowingly receives the 
benefit of such discrimination, or with 
customers of either of them. . . . 
0
 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: 
 
 [A]ny person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall 
recover threefold the damages by him 
sustained. . . . 
4 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Stelwagon is a wholesale distributor of roofing, siding 
and related construction materials.  Its principal customer base 
consists of small to medium-sized roofing contractors located in 
the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, area.  In early 1988, Stelwagon 
entered into an oral, exclusive distributorship agreement with 
Tarmac, a Wilmington, Delaware-based manufacturer of modified 
asphalt products ("MAPs").0  Under the agreement, Tarmac agreed 
not to sell its MAPs to any other distributors in the 
Philadelphia area except for Roofer's Mart, Inc., a pre-existing 
distributor.0  In return, Stelwagon promised to promote and 
develop a market for Tarmac MAPs. 
 In 1988, Stelwagon began actively promoting Tarmac MAPs 
as agreed.  In order to build a demand for Tarmac's products, 
Stelwagon refrained from acquiring any new lines of MAPs, and 
ceased aggressive marketing of its other, non-Tarmac MAPs. 
Stelwagon sold Tarmac MAPs without incident in the relationship 
                     
0
 MAPs are polyester or fiberglass mats applied by torch or 
hot asphalt which are sold by the roll and principally used to 
cover flat roofs.  
0
 Tarmac insists that the terms of the contract provided for 
sales to Stelwagon and one other distributor, and consequently, 
if Roofer's Mart discontinued selling Tarmac MAPs, Tarmac could 
sell to another distributor.  This distinction is significant 
because Roofer's Mart's Philadelphia warehouse burned down in 
late 1989 and Tarmac began selling MAPs to Allied Roofing 
Products ("Allied"), another Philadelphia distributor. 
 
 Because we believe that the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party, provides a rational basis 
for the jury's factual finding that the terms of the contract 
are, in fact, those terms that Stelwagon allege, we will not 
disturb that finding.  See Intermilo, Inc. v. I.P. Enterprises, 
Inc., 19 F.3d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1994). 
5 
until early 1989, when Stelwagon became aware of sales made to 
several of its competitors in violation of the agreement.0  At 
around the same time, Stelwagon also learned that Tarmac was 
selling MAPs to two competitors -- Standard Roofing Company 
("Standard") and Celotex Corporation ("Celotex") -- at 
preferential prices.  Stelwagon first complained to Tarmac about 
these sales, and eventually brought this action in February 1992. 
 At the close of Stelwagon's case, and again at the 
close of all evidence, Tarmac moved for judgment as a matter of 
law.  Both of these motions were denied and the case was 
submitted to the jury, which rendered a verdict in Stelwagon's 
favor on both the price discrimination and breach of contract 
claims, and awarded damages in the amount of $2,272,000.0  The 
district court trebled the antitrust damages under section 4 of 
the Clayton Act, and entered judgment for Stelwagon in the amount 
of $3,816,000.  Tarmac renewed its motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and, alternatively, for a new trial.  The district 
court denied the motions, but granted Tarmac's request for a 
remittitur based on a finding that "the damages awarded by the 
jury in this case are unsupported by the evidence and are grossly 
excessive."  Stelwagon Manufacturing Company v. Tarmac Roofing 
Systems, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  The 
                     
0
 Stelwagon first became aware of Tarmac's sales to Sellmore 
Roofing in Philadelphia, and later learned that Tarmac was 
selling MAPs to BJ Supply Company and Allied Roofing Co., one of 
Stelwagon's principal competitors in Philadelphia. 
0
 The jury awarded Stelwagon $1,500,000 in damages for breach 
of contract and an additional $772,000 for the antitrust 
violation. 
6 
district court reduced the damages award for breach of contract 
to $74,242, and likewise reduced the antitrust damages to 
$450,383.50.  After trebling the Robinson-Patman damages, the 
district court entered judgment for Stelwagon in the amount of 
$1,423,392.50.  This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 On appeal, Tarmac challenges the district court's 
denial of its post-trial motions.  Specifically, Tarmac claims 
that the judgment should be reversed because Stelwagon failed to 
present sufficient evidence to (1) establish a prima facie 
Robinson-Patman violation; (2) prove actual antitrust injury; and 
(3) support the award of damages under the Clayton Act.  Tarmac 
also argues that Stelwagon's breach of contract claim is barred 
by the statute of frauds.0  Our review of the district court's 
denial of Tarmac's motion for judgment as a matter of law is 
plenary.  Intermilo, Inc. v. I.P. Enterprises, Inc., 19 F.3d 890 
(3d Cir. 1994).  The legal foundation for the factfinder's 
verdict is reviewed de novo while the factual findings are 
reviewed to "determine whether the evidence and justifiable 
inferences most favorable to the prevailing party afford any 
rational basis for the verdict."  Id., quoting Bhaya v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 259 (3d Cir. 1987).   
II.  THE ROBINSON-PATMAN CLAIM 
                     
0
 In the alternative, Tarmac raises various trial errors 
which it argues require reversal.  Because of our decision on the 
merits, however, we need not reach the remainder of Tarmac's 
claims. 
7 
 By its terms, the Robinson-Patman Act is a prophylactic 
statute and does not require that the alleged discrimination must 
in fact have harmed competition.  J. Truett Payne Company, Inc. 
v. Chrysler Motor Corporation, 451 U.S. 557, 561 (1981). Instead, 
a violation is established upon a showing that "the effect of 
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition."  
Id.  For the purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act, price 
discrimination means nothing more than a difference in price 
charged to different purchasers or customers of the 
discriminating seller for products of like grade or quality. 
Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1532; see also F.T.C. v. Annheuser-Busch, 
Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).  Price discrimination standing 
alone, however, is not illegal per se.  Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1532; 
O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 346 (3d Cir. 1981). 
Rather, in order to establish a prima facie violation of section 
2(a), "a reasonable possibility of harm, often referred to as 
competitive injury, must be shown."  Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1531. 
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 A.  Competitive Injury 
1. 
 We note initially that as a prerequisite to 
establishing secondary line injury, a plaintiff must "first prove 
that, as the disfavored purchaser, it was engaged in actual 
competition with the favored purchaser(s) as of the time of the 
price differential."  Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v. Falstaff 
Brewing Corporation, 842 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1987).  Moreover, 
to satisfy this "competitive nexus" requirement, it "must be 
shown that, as of the time the price differential was imposed, 
the favored and disfavored purchasers competed at the same 
functional level, i.e., all wholesalers or all retailers, and 
within the same geographic market."  Id. at 585. 
 Tarmac claims that Stelwagon failed to show the 
requisite competitive contact with either Standard or Celotex 
and, as a result, did not establish a prima facie violation of 
the Robinson-Patman Act.  Specifically, Tarmac argues that 
Stelwagon was not in competition with Standard because Standard 
operated its business outside of the geographical area where 
Stelwagon's principal customer base was located, and that 
Stelwagon was likewise not in competition with Celotex because 
the two companies did not operate at the same functional level, 
i.e., that they did not compete at the same distribution level 
because Celotex is a manufacturer and Stelwagon a distributor. 
The district court rejected these contentions and concluded that 
the record contained sufficient evidence to support a finding 
9 
that both Standard and Celotex were in head-to-head competition 
with Stelwagon.  We agree. 
 Standard is a distributor of roofing products and its 
customer base is similar to that of Stelwagon's.  Although 
Standard is located in Trenton, New Jersey, there was evidence 
that Standard employed salespeople in Philadelphia and that it 
shipped directly to its Philadelphia customers from south Jersey. 
There was additional evidence that Standard was a principal 
competitor of one of Stelwagon's Philadelphia locations as well 
as Stelwagon's Camden, New Jersey location.  In our view, this 
evidence was sufficient to support a finding of competitive 
contact between Stelwagon and Standard. 
 With respect to Celotex, we, too, reject the argument 
advanced by Tarmac that the weight of the evidence supports the 
conclusion that Celotex was not in competition with Stelwagon. 
The basis of Tarmac's argument, as mentioned above, is that the 
two companies were not operating at the same functional level and 
were, therefore, not competing customers for purposes of the Act. 
See F.T.C. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1968).  
 It is undisputed, however, that the MAPs sold by 
Celotex, under its own private label, were, in fact, 
"manufactured," that is, made, by Tarmac.  It is also uncontested 
that the MAPs Tarmac produced for Celotex were identical to those 
Tarmac sold to Stelwagon except that they did not bear the Tarmac 
label.  Although there was evidence that tended to support 
10 
Tarmac's characterization of Celotex as a manufacturer,0 the fact 
that there were conflicts and contradictions is of little 
significance, since the resolution of such inconsistencies is 
peculiarly within the province of the jury.  In our view, the 
record as a whole contains sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's finding, in the first instance, as well as the district 
court's conclusion thereafter, that Celotex "was in economic 
reality acting on the same distribution level as Stelwagon." 
Stelwagon, 852 F.2d at 1368. 
2. 
 Once the existence of a competitive relationship has 
been established, "[i]njury to competition is usually shown in 
either of two ways:  proof of lost sales or profits, Falls City 
Industries [Inc. v. Vanco Beverages, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434-35 
(1983)]; Rose Confections, Inc. v. Ambrosia Chocolate Co., 816 
F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1987), or under the Morton Salt test, proof of 
a substantial price discrimination between competitors over 
time."  Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1535.   In this case, the district 
court concluded that "[t]he record . . . contains evidence that 
would support a jury finding of harm to competition under either 
method."  Stelwagon, 862 F. Supp at 1368.  We thus turn to the 
specific evidence Stelwagon presented at trial to determine 
                     
0
 For example, there was testimony from witnesses for both 
parties that Celotex was widely thought of and referred to as a 
manufacturer.  In addition, there was evidence that,like a 
manufacturer, Celotex sold the private label MAPs to distributors 
who, like Stelwagon, sold MAPs to contractors and homeowners. 
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whether the record is indeed sufficient to support a finding of 
competitive injury. 
(a) Substantial Price Discrimination Over Time 
 It is undisputed that a differential existed between 
the prices Tarmac charged Stelwagon for its MAPs and the prices 
Tarmac charged Standard and Celotex.  In addition, Stelwagon 
presented evidence that showed the price differential was 
substantial and that it was in effect for several years.  From 
this evidence, we believe the jury was entitled to infer harm to 
competition for, as the Supreme Court stated in Morton Salt, "we 
believe [it is] self-evident [] that there is a `reasonable 
possibility' that competition may be adversely affected by a 
practice under which manufacturers and producers sell their goods 
to some customers substantially cheaper that they sell like goods 
to the competitors of these customers."  Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 
50-51.  Because the amount and degree of the price discrimination 
are significant factors to be considered when determining whether 
a price differential is substantial, Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1538, we 
will first address the evidence in this case that pertains to the 
issue of substantiality. 
 Stelwagon presented a report submitted by its expert, 
Dr. Martin Perry.0  The report, insofar as it concerned the 
substantiality of the price differentials, was based on Dr. 
Perry's examination of Tarmac's invoices on sales of MAPs 
                     
0
 The district court qualified Dr. Perry as expert "in the 
general field of economics and specifically in the field of price 
discrimination, damages flowing therefrom, as well as damages 
flowing from breach of distribution agreements."  App. at 476. 
12 
manufactured at its plant in Chester, Pennsylvania.  App. at 77. 
The invoices, which included the date of sale, distributor, 
product name, number of rolls and price charged, covered a period 
from 1987 through late 1991 and included sales of six types of 
Tarmac MAPs to Stelwagon and seven other distributors which, at 
the time, resold MAPs in the Philadelphia area.0  App. at 81-82. 
 According to the expert report, between 1988 and 1991, 
Standard received prices ranging from 5 to 20 percent lower than 
the prices charged to Stelwagon and, during this same period, 
Celotex received prices which ranged from 10 to 25 percent lower 
than the prices Tarmac charged to Stelwagon.  App. to 88-93 and 
108-122.  With respect to APP 4S, the Tarmac product which 
accounted for 40.4 percent of the total unit sales of all 
products included on the invoices, Standard received a 12.5 
percent discount relative to the price paid by Stelwagon, while 
Celotex received a discount of at least 10 percent.  App. 81 and 
90-91.  Based on these figures, we believe the price differential 
Tarmac offered Standard and Celotex only can fairly be 
characterized as substantial.0 
                     
0
 Of the seven distributors, we are concerned only with sales 
to Standard and Celotex for the purposes of this appeal. 
0
 Another compelling factor considered by courts in 
determining competitive injury in secondary line cases is the 
duration of the price discrimination.  Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1539. 
Generally, the longer the duration, the more likely injury will 
be found.  Id., citing Rose Confections, 816 F.2d at 385 (two 
years); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 
1987) (four years).  In our view, the four-year period analyzed 
by Dr. Perry's report establishes the requisite duration of price 
discrimination and further supports an inference of competitive 
injury. 
13 
 Because we agree with the district court that Stelwagon 
offered sufficient proof of a substantial price difference over 
time, which alone suffices to establish a violation of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, we need not address the issue of whether 
Stelwagon presented sufficient proof of lost sales or profits 
insofar as such evidence pertains to establishing a violation of 
the Act.0  
B.  Antitrust Damages 
 As we stated in Feeser, "[d]emonstrating competitive 
injury as part of a prima facie case suffices to support 
injunctive relief and implicates further examination of a 
plaintiff's entitlement to treble damages under section 4 of the 
Clayton Act," Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1531; however, to recover such 
damages, "a plaintiff must establish cognizable injury 
attributable to [the] antitrust violation and some approximation 
of damage."  J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 561.  In other words, a 
plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the price 
discrimination and actual damage suffered.0  Feeser, 909 F.2d at 
                     
0
 As discussed below, we do not believe Stelwagon offered 
sufficient evidence of lost sales or profits to prove actual 
antitrust damages, and is therefore not entitled to treble 
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
0
 The Supreme Court has described these two requirements 
collectively as "antitrust injury": 
 
 Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, 
which is to say injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and 
that flows from that which makes defendants' 
acts unlawful.  The injury should reflect the 
anticompetitive effect either of the 
violation or of anticompetitive acts made 
possible by the violation.  It should, in 
14 
1539, citing Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 
(1969).  Traditionally, however, antitrust plaintiffs have not 
been held to an unduly rigorous standard of proving antitrust 
injury.  J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 565.  Because 
damage issues in these cases are rarely 
susceptible to the kind of concrete, detailed 
proof of injury which is available in other 
contexts[, t]he [Supreme] Court has 
repeatedly held that in the absence of more 
precise proof, the factfinder may "conclude 
as a matter of just and reasonable inference 
from the proof of defendants' wrongful acts 
and their tendency to injure plaintiffs' 
business, and from the evidence of the 
decline in prices, profits and values, not 
shown to be attributable to other causes, 
that defendants' wrongful acts had caused 
damage to the plaintiffs."  Bigelow v. RKO 
Pictures, Inc., [327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946)]. 
See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo 
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 377-79 (1927); 
Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment 
Paper, Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561-566 (1931). 
J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 565-66, quoting Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-124 (1969). 
Although the proof requirements of section 4 are "less than 
stringent,"  Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1540, there must be some direct 
evidence of injury to support an award of damages.  See id.; S&W 
Construction and Materials Co., Inc. v. Dravo Basic Materials 
Co., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D. Miss. 1992);  Chrysler 
                                                                  
short, be "the type of loss that the claimed 
violations . . . would be likely to cause." 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research[, Inc.], 395 U.S. [100,] 125 
[(1969)]. 
 
Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see J. 
Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 489. 
15 
Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., Inc., 670 F.2d 575, 581-82 
(5th Cir. 1982).  
 Tarmac claims that Stelwagon failed to show it suffered 
actual antitrust injury as a result of the price discrimination. 
Specifically, Tarmac claims that Stelwagon fell short of proving 
(1) that it actually suffered lost sales and profits; (2) that 
any proven lost sales and profits were caused by Standard and/or 
Celotex receiving favorable prices; and (3) the amount of the 
sales and profits that Stelwagon lost.  The district court, 
however, found that "the testimony of Dr. Perry and the anecdotal 
evidence of [Stelwagon's] customer's statements, admitted under 
the state of mind hearsay exception, . . . establish[ed] that 
[Stelwagon] actually lost sales to Celotex and Standard." 
Stelwagon, 862 F. Supp. at 1368.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we disagree. 
16 
1.  Anecdotal Evidence 
 The district court admitted -- under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(3) (and over Tarmac's standing objection) -- the 
hearsay testimony of Stelwagon employees about out-of-court 
conversations with Stelwagon customers.  Essentially, the 
testimony was that the customers could and did purchase Tarmac 
MAPs from Standard at prices lower than Stelwagon's prices.  
 Statements that are considered under the exception to 
the hearsay rule found at Fed. R. Evid. 803(3),0 commonly 
referred to as the "state of mind" exception, cannot be offered 
to prove the truth of the underlying facts asserted.  Grove Fresh 
Distributors, Inc. v. New England Apple Products Co., Inc., 969 
F.2d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 1992), citing Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. 
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 914 (2d Cir. 1962). 
The district court, in explaining its decision to allow the 
anecdotal testimony, acknowledged the limited use of evidence 
admitted under Rule 803(3):  "statements of [a] customer as to 
his reasons for not dealing with a supplier are admissible for 
the limited purpose, i.e., the purpose of proving customer    
motive, but not as evidence of the facts recited as furnishing 
                     
0
 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides in pertinent part: 
 
 Then existing mental, emotional, or 
physical condition.  A statement of the 
declarant's then existing state of mind, 
emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not 
including a statement of memory or belief to 
prove the fact remembered or believed . . . . 
17 
the motive."0  App. at 255, citing Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1535 n.11; 
United Shoe Machinery, 297 F.2d at 906.  Notwithstanding this 
express acknowledgement, it is clear from the district court's 
opinion disposing of Tarmac's motion for judgment as a matter of 
law, that the court considered the customer statements for a 
purpose beyond which they were originally, and properly, 
admitted:   
Stelwagon [] introduced . . . the anecdotal 
evidence of its customer statements, admitted 
under the state of mind exception, see Fed. 
R. Evid. 803(3); J.F. Feeser, 909 F.2d at 
1535 n.11; Kraft Foods, Inc. v. BC-USA, Inc., 
840 F. Supp. 344, 348 (E.D. Pa. 1993), to 
establish that it actually lost sales to 
Celotex and Standard. 
Stelwagon, 862 F. Supp. at 1368 (emphasis added). 
 Because the statements properly could not have been 
admitted in the first instance as proof of the fact of the matter 
asserted, we believe the district court's reliance on them as 
proof of actual antitrust damages, in the form of lost sales, was 
in error.0 
                     
0
 As we stated in Feeser, "the reason why a customer was not 
doing business with a particular seller is relevant in a lost 
profits/sales inquiry and its causal connection to the pricing 
practices of the alleged violator."  Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1535 
n.11.  Although the customer statements at issue in this case 
clearly were admissible as evidence of why the customers were not 
purchasing Tarmac MAPs from Stelwagon, i.e., because they thought 
they could get a better deal elsewhere, the statements were not 
admissible as proof that Stelwagon's customers did, in fact, 
purchase MAPs from one of Stelwagon's competitors. 
0
 We hasten to note that the district court's reliance on 
Feeser in admitting the customer statements was misplaced. 
Although in Feeser we concluded that the district court erred in 
excluding similar anecdotal evidence, we did so in the context of 
an appeal from a summary judgment proceeding.  Our de novo review 
of the depositions revealed that Feeser had offered sufficient 
admissible evidence to meet the burden of the nonmovant at 
18 
2.  Expert Evidence 
 The only other evidence offered by Stelwagon that 
possibly could have supported a finding of actual injury was the 
expert testimony and report of Dr. Perry.  In essence, Dr. 
Perry's testimony with respect to Stelwagon's lost sales and 
profits mirrored the conclusions published in his report, which 
summarizes the methodology used to estimate Stelwagon's losses as 
follows: 
In order to forecast the lost sales of MAPs 
by Stelwagon as a result of the price 
advantage of other distributors, we begin 
with the year 1988 when Stelwagon first 
successfully introduced Tarmac's products in 
the Philadelphia metropolitan area.  But for 
the price advantage of other distributors, we 
assume that Stelwagon's sales of MAPs would 
have followed a pattern similar to 
Stelwagon's sales of other products 
(excluding MAPs). . . .  For this reason, we 
use Stelwagon's sales of other products to 
forecast the sales of MAPs. . . .  From this 
forecast, we then calculate the lost sales of 
MAPs in the years following 1988.  These lost 
sales can be converted into lost profits by 
applying Stelwagon's markup on these 
products. 
App. at 96; see also App. at 479-481, 491-93. 
 In other words, based on the assumption that but for 
Tarmac's price discrimination, Stelwagon's sales of MAPs would 
have tracked its sales of non-modified products, Dr. Perry 
                                                                  
summary judgment.  Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1535.  Presumably, Feeser 
would have been able to produce the customers themselves at 
trial.  Accordingly, the rule in this circuit is that hearsay 
statements can be considered on a motion for summary judgment if 
they are capable of being admissible at trial.  Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Company, 998 F.2d 1224, 12 
34 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993), citing Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1542. 
19 
concluded that Stelwagon lost $257,000 in profits as a result of 
Tarmac's illegal pricing policy.  App. at 501. 
 Tarmac's challenge to Dr. Perry's testimony and report 
is twofold:  first, Tarmac argues that the expert evidence should 
have been excluded because it was "speculative, not based on 
actual facts and data, and [because] any probative value [was] 
substantially outweighed by [its] prejudicial effect." 
Appellant's Br. at 43.  Second, Tarmac claims that the expert 
evidence "did not constitute a `legally sufficient evidentiary 
basis' for the judgment rendered below."  Appellant's Br. at 33. 
Although we do not agree with Tarmac's contention that the 
district court erred in admitting Dr. Perry's testimony, or in 
failing to strike the testimony in response to a motion by Tarmac 
at the conclusion of the direct examination, we do agree that, 
standing alone, the expert's opinions, as reflected in his 
testimony and report, are insufficient to support the finding of 
actual damage. 
 Significantly, Dr. Perry's analysis failed to 
sufficiently link any decline in Stelwagon's MAPs sales to price 
discrimination.  The sales may have been lost for reasons apart 
from the price discrimination -- reasons that Dr. Perry's 
analysis apparently did not take into account.  For example, the 
evidence showed that Stelwagon had higher overhead costs than its 
competitors.  In addition, there was undisputed evidence that 
Stelwagon experienced other business complications during the 
relevant time period.  In 1988, for example, Stelwagon terminated 
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a vice-president, two territorial managers and three key 
employees for their part in an embezzlement scheme. 
 We recognize, of course, that "[i]f some of 
[plaintiff's] injury was attributed to the price discrimination, 
[the defendant] is responsible to that extent."  Falls City, 460 
U.S. at 437; Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1537.  In this case, however, 
the only evidence directly linking the Robinson-Patman violation 
to any decline in sales and profits Stelwagon may have 
experienced is the anecdotal testimony of Stelwagon employees 
that, as discussed above, should not have been admitted as proof 
of lost sales' profits.  Not only did Stelwagon fail to offer any 
documentary evidence as to the effect of the discrimination on 
resale prices, it also failed to identify a single lost 
customer.0  As a result, Stelwagon's claim for damages under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act must fail. See Feeser, 909 F.2d at 
1540 (proof requirements of section 4 are satisfied by direct 
evidence of lost sales, evidence that the substantial price 
discrimination reflected in the resale prices of Feeser and the 
favored competitors directly resulted in Feeser losing certain 
sales and losing profits on others, and expert report outlining 
the magnitude of the price difference). 
                     
0
 In Feeser, upon which the district court relied in 
admitting and crediting the customer statements, we expressly 
noted that "[t]he evidence we find most persuasive is that of the 
customers of Feeser, corroborating the sales personnel's 
testimony, that the reason Feeser lost sales was because its 
prices for Serv-A-Portion products were not competitive". Feeser, 
909 F.2d at 1537. 
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 Having concluded that Stelwagon failed to present any 
direct evidence of lost sales or profits caused by the 
discriminatory pricing, we will reverse the district court's 
judgment insofar as it concludes that the record contains 
sufficient evidence to support an award of damages under section 
4 of the Clayton Act.0 
III.  BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM 
 In addition to the Robinson-Patman claim, Stelwagon 
brought a state action for breach of contract based primarily on 
Tarmac's MAPs sales to one of Stelwagon's principal competitors, 
Allied Roofing, in violation of the exclusive, distributorship 
agreement between the parties.  Tarmac argues that enforcement of 
the contract is barred by the statute of frauds because the 
agreement was never reduced to writing and because none of the 
statute's exceptions apply.  Specifically, Tarmac argues that the 
district court erred in concluding (1) that Stelwagon established 
a waiver of the statute by a showing of custom in the industry, 
and (2) that the performance exception removed the 
distributorship contract from the statute's protection. 
 Although, in general, the statute of frauds acts as a 
bar to the enforcement of oral agreements, it is well settled 
that such agreements may be taken out of the statute of frauds if 
there is evidence to establish that the agreement was made.  M. 
Leff Radio Parts, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 387, 394 
                     
0
 Because of our conclusion on the issue of Stelwagon's 
entitlement to damages under the Clayton Act, we do not reach 
Tarmac's argument that the amount of damages is unsupported by 
the evidence. 
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(E.D. Pa. 1988).  This rule promotes the underlying purposes of 
the statute of frauds:  to prevent perjury and fraud, Simplex 
Precast Industries, Inc. v. Biehl, 149 A.2d 121, 123 (1959), and 
to prevent parties from escaping their legal obligations.  M. 
Leff Radio Parts, 706 F. Supp. at 394. 
 Stelwagon's contract claim survives Tarmac's statute of 
frauds challenge based on the established doctrine that part 
performance of an indivisible contract will take the whole 
contract out of the statute of frauds.  W.I. Snyder Corp. v. 
Caracciolo, 541 A.2d 755, 779 (Pa Super. 1988).  "We conclude it 
is appropriate for Pennsylvania to follow the weight of authority 
in this area and rule that part payment of an indivisible 
contract takes the entire contract outside of the requirements of 
the Statute of Frauds."  Id. 
 We agree with the district court's conclusion that 
Stelwagon's exclusive dealing agreement with Tarmac was 
indivisible.  Any other conclusion renders Stelwagon and Tarmac's 
agreement meaningless.  If the contract was divisible by time or 
by shipments, Tarmac would only have obligated itself to deal 
exclusively with Stelwagon so long as it chose to do so.0  Nor is 
                     
0
 The lack of a definite date on which the agreement ends 
does not determine Stelwagon's claim.  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2204(c) preserves a contract even if one or more terms are 
indefinite as long as there is a "reasonably certain basis for 
giving an appropriate remedy."  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2309(b) 
states "Where the contract provides for successive performances 
but is indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable time 
but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at any time by 
either party."  Tarmac has never argued that it terminated the 
exclusive dealership arrangement nor that the four-year period of 
exclusivity by Stelwagon was not reasonable. 
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there any way to limit the agreement by geographic area without 
doing violence to the jury's conclusion that the exclusive 
dealing agreement between Tarmac and Stelwagon covered the whole 
Philadelphia area.  Once Tarmac granted Stelwagon an exclusive 
distributor contract, albeit orally, and acted on it, that 
agreement could only be enforced as a whole or not at all. 
 Moreover, the record reflects more than sufficient 
evidence of Tarmac's part performance.  From 1988 to 1989, Tarmac 
honored the exclusive distributor contract.  Tarmac forbade 
Sellmore Roofing, one of Stelwagon's competitors, from selling 
Tarmac MAPs in Philadelphia after Stelwagon alerted Tarmac to 
Sellmore's sales.  Tarmac refused to sell MAPs to Bradco, a 
Philadelphia roofing supplier, because of its contract with 
Stelwagon.  These performances validate Stelwagon's claim that an 
exclusive distributor contract existed.  Hence, Stelwagon's 
contract claims should not be barred by the statute of frauds and 
the jury's award of damages for that claim must be affirmed.0 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, the district court's 
denial of Tarmac's motion for judgment as a matter of law will be 
affirmed insofar as it pertains to Stelwagon's breach of contract 
claim.  We will also affirm the district court's finding that 
Stelwagon successfully proved that Tarmac's discriminatory 
pricing scheme violated the Robinson-Patman Act; however, because 
                     
0
 Because of our decision on the issue of part performance, 
we need not address the parties' arguments with respect to usage 
of trade. 
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we do not believe that Stelwagon offered sufficient proof of 
actual antitrust damages, we will vacate that portion of the 
district court's judgment that upholds the jury's award of 
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, and remand the case 
for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________ 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, concurring, 
 I agree that Stelwagon's antitrust verdict cannot stand and that Stelwagon is 
entitled to breach of contract damages.  I write separately because I have some 
differences with Judge Lewis with respect to his analysis regarding Celotex Corporation.  
I am also of the opinion that the issue of damages as it arose from Stelwagon's relations 
with Standard should be explained.  Those differences and that explanation do not call for 
a difference in result.   
 
I. 
 I agree with the majority that proof of actual competition is critical to proof 
of a Robinson-Patman second line price discrimination claim.  Maj. Op. typescript at 8.  
As Judge Lewis' opinion states, actual competition requires proof of both functional and 
geographic competition -- proof that "the favored and disfavored purchasers competed at 
the same functional level, i.e., all wholesalers or all retailers, and within the same 
geographic market."  Id. (quoting Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v. Fallstaff Brewing Corp.
842 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 I cannot agree however that Celotex competed with Stelwagon.  Celotex sold 
private label MAPs, which were manufactured by Tarmac, in various parts of the east coast, 
including Philadelphia.  But unlike Stelwagon, Celotex sold to distributors, not to 
roofing contractors.  Thus, Celotex sold to Stelwagon's competitors, not Stelwagon's 
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customers.  That is to say, Celotex operated at a different functional level than 
Stelwagon, i.e. one functional level above Stelwagon. 
 Keenan, Stelwagon's President, testified that Celotex sold almost exclusively to 
other distributors and repeatedly offered to sell to Stelwagon.  App. 299-300.  Not one of 
the 163 Celotex customers identified at trial was proven or even alleged to be a roofing 
contractor.  App. 138-46. 
 Despite this evidence, Stelwagon claims that it competed with Celotex based on 
Keenan's hearsay testimony that Celotex had once sold directly to Alper Roofing, a 
contractor. App. 302-03.0  Keenan had previously testified that manufacturers occasi
sold directly to contractors for large jobs.  App. 300.  I cannot agree that evidence of 
one sale sufficed to permit the jury to conclude that Celotex competed on a general basis 
with Stelwagon. 
 Nor does the record reveal that the price discount received by Celotex violated 
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act.  See Texaco v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 571 (1990).0  The 
                     
0
 I understand footnotes 16 and 17 to state that Keenan's hearsay testimony was 
admissible at trial for the limited purpose of showing motive only.  If indeed Stelwagon 
had produced at trial the customer who made the statement to Keenan, that testimony would 
certainly have been admissible.  Short of producing the actual declarant at trial, 
however, Keenan's testimony was still hearsay and thus had to satisfy a hearsay exception 
(here Fed. R. Evid. 803(3)).  It was accordingly admissible but limited to proof of 
motive. 
 
 Stelwagon introduced evidence that other contractors bought Celotex's product 
but Stelwagon did not produce evidence that those contractors purchased the MAPs directly 
from Celotex. The fact that a consumer may buy Dole canned goods from Foodtown does not 
mean that A & P, Foodtown's competitor, is also Dole's competitor. 
0
  In Texaco, Hasbrouck had purchased gasoline for his retail station at a price which 
exceeded that which Texaco had sold to two distributors.  These distributors had then sold 
to retail stations which they owned and to independent retail stations. 496 U.S. at 547
51.  The Court concluded that the distributors' mixed functions, the evidence of 
intentional price discrimination by Texaco, and the amount of the discount as compared to 
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record here is devoid of evidence of Celotex's costs as compared with any price discount 
received.  There is no evidence of the prices Celotex charged its customers, and there is 
no evidence in the record that Celotex operated both as a distributor as well as a 
supplier in Philadelphia.  This failure of proofs distinguishes Stelwagon's claims from 
those discussed in Texaco.  Hence, on this record, I could not hold that Celotex competed 
with Stelwagon. 
 Despite this disagreement with the majority, I concur in Judge Lewis' opinion 
that Stelwagon failed to produce evidence of actual competitive injury -- that is, 
evidence of actual lost sales.  I therefore agree that we must reverse Stelwagon's 
antitrust verdict on that account. 
 Even if I had not concluded that Stelwagon had failed to prove actual antitrust 
injury, I would still vote to reverse Stelwagon's verdict because Stelwagon failed to 
quantify its damages adequately.  While the burden of proving damage in an antitrust case 
is reduced, see J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565-67 (1981), 
the damages alleged must arise from whatever injury to competition has been demonstr
 Stelwagon's proof at trial established that Standard Roofing Supply competed 
with Stelwagon only for sales out of Stelwagon's Comly (North Philadelphia) and Camden, 
New Jersey warehouses.  Despite this, Stelwagon sought to quantify its damages only 
respect to the combined sales of all six of its warehouses.  Stelwagon never broke down 
its sales separately for the Comly and Camden locations.  Given that Standard competed 
only with those two warehouses, however, Stelwagon's combined sales figures could not and 
                                                                                          
the actual costs incurred by the distributors sufficed to prove a price discrimination 
claim.  Id. at 572-73. 
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did not provide an adequate basis to quantify any damage which resulted from the favorable 
prices Standard received. 
 It would be impermissibly speculative to extrapolate from Stelwagon's overall 
sales figures, which Stelwagon entered into evidence, the particular damage to Stelwagon 
that may have resulted from price discrimination at Stelwagon's Comly and Camden 
locations. 
 
II. 
 Having expressed my reservations about the majority's opinion as to whether 
Celotex competed with Stelwagon and the quantification of damages, I nonetheless reach the 
same result as the majority has.  Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing 
Stelwagon's verdict on the Robinson-Patman claim and affirming Stelwagon's verdict on the 
contract claim. 
